# Defines users that can access the web (console, demo, etc.)įurthermore, SELinux doesn't allow users to read /opt/apache-activemq-5.*/conf/ files - still the passwords are hardcoded.ĭetails - Hardcoded ActiveMQ credentials for JMX Other credentials found: /]# cat /opt/apache-activemq-*/conf/jetty-realm.properties Luckily, the firewall blocks all incoming connections to these 2 ports. In the latest version, it appears the passwords are now in clear-text.ĪctiveMQ listen to all the public interfaces: /]# ps -auxww|grep -i activeĪctivem+ 1065 0.9 1.2 4042088 208636 ? Sl 04:37 0:06 /usr/bin/java -Xms256m -Xmx512m _PACKAGES=java.lang,curity,java.util. =true -Djava.io.tmpdir=/var/lib/activemq/tmp -Dactivemq.classpath=/opt/apache-activemq-5.16.0//conf:/opt/apache-activemq-5.16.0//./lib/: =/opt/apache-activemq-5.16.0/ -Dactivemq.base=/opt/apache-activemq-5.16.0/ nf=/opt/apache-activemq-5.16.0//conf -Dactivemq.data=/var/lib/activemq/data -jar /opt/apache-activemq-5.16.0//bin/activemq.jar /]# netstat -laputen|grep 1065 Note: Prior to the 3.5 version, the file credentials.properties contained the identical encrypted credentials, instead of clear-text credentials: /]# cat /opt/apache-activemq-5.10.0/conf/credentials.properties Guest.password=ENC(Cf3Jf3tM+UrSOoaKU50od5CuBa8rxjoL) It is possible to retrieve hardcoded ActiveMQ credentials by reading the /opt/apache-activemq-5.*/conf/credentials.properties file: /]# cat /opt/apache-activemq-5.*/conf/credentials.propertiesĪ new file ( credentials-enc.properties, which was the file credentials.properties in previous version of OpenManage) appeared in the 3.5 version: /]# cat /opt/apache-activemq-5.*/conf/credentials-enc.propertiesĪctivemq.password=ENC(mYRkg+4Q4hua1kvpCCI2hg=) We also removed some potential vulnerabilities because their exploitations were not straightforward due to the presence of SELinux. When checking openmanage enterprise 3.6.1, it appears some vulnerabilities were silently patched (java stuff and a LPE). When checking openmanage enterprise 3.5, we also found new vulnerabilities (java stuff, grub, idrac).
![dell openmanage switch administrator default login dell openmanage switch administrator default login](https://www.manualowl.com/manual_guide/products/dell-powerconnect-2808-users-guide-2a04e49/51.png)
This research was done a year ago (in July 2020) against OpenManage 3.4 and we confirmed all the versions - including the latest version (3.6.1) - are affected by the vulnerabilities. We reminded we still had unpublished research in Dell products. We had forgotten these vulns until we saw some tweets regarding dbutil_2_3.sys and
#Dell openmanage switch administrator default login password#
Grub password stored in postgres, without authentication for local user.Multiple TOCTOUs in "security_tool.sh" shell script.Local Privilege Escalation from group omctui.Multiple Local Privilege Escalations from group tomcat.Multiple Local Privilege Escalations from group mcsitasksvc.Multiple Local Privilege Escalations from mcsimetricssvc - partially silently patched in version 3.6.1.
![dell openmanage switch administrator default login dell openmanage switch administrator default login](http://img.youtube.com/vi/zb2DSXt_nfc/0.jpg)
![dell openmanage switch administrator default login dell openmanage switch administrator default login](https://i0.wp.com/volumes.blog/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/091819_1308_openmanagei1.png)
![dell openmanage switch administrator default login dell openmanage switch administrator default login](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/uqPdljocbk8/maxresdefault.jpg)